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КРИМІНОМЕТРИЧНИЙ АНАЛІЗ ПРИЙНЯТНОСТІ КОРУПЦІЇ ТА УМОВ ФОРМУВАННЯ ЦІНИ КОРУПЦІЙНОЇ ПОСЛУГИ

Анотація. Абсолютно всі прояви корупції формально обумовлюються девіантною поведінкою осіб, котрі можуть бути віднесені до суб'єктів корупційних правопорушень. У той же час, в теоретичному контексті недостатньо дослідженим залишається питання про те, чому ж люди здійснюють корупційний злочин, не дивлячись на очевидний загальнолюдський осуд корупції та корупціонерів. Тому основна мета роботи полягає у кримінометричному аналізі прийнятності корупції та умов формування ціни корупційної послуги. Досягнути поставленої мети дозволили методи типологізації та кримінометричного моделювання. Встановлено, що кожній категорії державних службовців кореспондує певний рівень дисципліни та відповідальності, що відповідає важливості функцій, які виконують службовці відповідної категорії, і ризикам неправомірного ухилення від виконання ними цих функцій. В роботі визначено умови прийнятності корупції – умов, за наявності яких, відповідна девіантна поведінка зі всіма її ризиками, стає привабливою в очах потенційного суб'єкта корупційного злочину. Найважливішою умовою прийнятності корупційної моделі поведінки для особи, яка надає неправомірну корупційну вигоду, буде те, що ця вигода за своєю ціною і цінністю буде перевищувати, зокрема, час, витрачений нею на отримання публічної послуги корупційним чином, відповідні ризики тощо. У той же час, відповідна прийнятність корупційної моделі поведінки для особи, що приймає неправомірну корупційну вигоду, буде констатуватись завжди, коли ця вигода дорівнюватиме або ж перевищуватиме її корупційні очікування. Разом з тим, категорія «корупційне очікування» дозволяє, з одного боку, визначити множинні закономірності формування ціни корупційної послуги, а, з іншого – розробити дієву антикорупційну логіку, що застосовуватиметься державою у процесі запобігання та протидії корупції. Всі дії держави та органів державної влади повинні бути системними, скоординованими на досягнення однієї мети. Зазначені напрями модернізації антикорупційної політики на державній службі, які будуть позитивно впливати на її діяльність.

Ключові слова: корупційна поведінка, корупційний податок, неправомірна вигода, прийнятність корупції, розгул корупції, хабар, ціна корупційної послуги.

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CRIMINOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION PERMISSIVENESS AND CONDITIONS OF PRICING IN CORRUPT SERVICES

Abstract. *All manifestations of corruption with no exceptions are formally conditioned by the deviant behaviour of individuals, who may be attributed to the entities of corruption offences. At the same time, in the theoretical context, the issue of the reason why people commit corruption crimes remains under-researched, regardless of observed universal condemnation of corruption and corrupt officials. Therefore, the main purpose of the paper is forensic analysis of the acceptability of corruption and the conditions for the formation of corruption services cost. Methods of typology and forensic modelling allowed achieving of the purpose. It has been established that each category of civil servants corresponds to a certain level of discipline and responsibility that, in its turn, corresponds to the importance of the functions performed by employees of the relevant category and the risks of misuse of these functions. The article has defined conditions of corruption permissiveness – the conditions under which the corresponding deviant behaviour with all its attendant risks becomes attractive in the minds of potential entities of corruption crimes. The most important condition for permissiveness of corrupt behaviour for a person providing unlawful corrupt benefit will be the fact that this benefit by its cost and value will exceed, in particular, the time spent by him or her to receive a public service in a corrupt way, associated risks, etc. At the same time, permissiveness of corrupt behaviour for a person accepting unlawful corruption benefit will always be stated if this benefit will be equal to or will exceed his or her corrupt expectations. However, the category “corruption waiting” allows, on the one hand, to identify multiple patterns of corrupt services’ pricing, and on the other hand, to develop efficient anti-corruption logic applied by the government in the process of preventing and combating corruption. All actions of a state and governing bodies should be systemic, coordinated to achieve one goal. The focuses on modernisation of anticorruption policy in the civil service, which will positively influence its activity, have been determined.*

Keywords: acceptability of corruption, bribe, corruption behaviour, corruption tax, improper benefit, price of corruption services, rampant corruption.

INTRODUCTION

After the cold war the attention of the world was attracted by the issues of prevention and overcome corruption that is considered by scientists as tenacious and always relevant problem, which penetrates all areas of human life activity [1]. Along with this, the end of the cold war conditioned the beginning of the period of terrible chaos in many countries. In them, as the Australian scientist adjunct professor John McFarlane noted, good governance was replaced with anarchy (states of former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia), intercommunal harmony

was destroyed by ethnic conflicts and genocidal acts (Ruanda and Bosnia), social balance was mutilated by increasing level of unemployment and impoverishment (Indonesia and Salvador), religious and cultural divisions that led to extreme violence (Alger and India), etc. [2]. In this, it is worth stressing that the end of the cold war and mentioned consequences are closely related to corruption – they are conditioned or/and deepened by it. Moreover, destructive impact of corruption is manifested not only in destabilised states (in which there are social and economic, political and other crisis phenomena) because corruption is extremely aggressive economic crime that has numerous manifestations [3] and influence in a parasite way in all governments, governing bodies, enterprises, charities and citizens all over the world. Corruption and its consequences indirectly threaten democracy and make society anxious, harm economy, conditioned exhaustive inefficiency, steal money from financial support and provision of basic social services [4;5]. That is, character of threaten of corruption to the world is analogic to threaten of nuclear war, which was expected in the period of the confrontation between the United States and the former USSR. In this, mentioned comparison of corruption consequences and nuclear war is not exaggeration of corruption significance. Destructive influence of corruption on quality of a human life, on the integrity and viability of the existing world order, does not cause serious doubts. In addition, the role of corruption should not be ignored also in genocides, wars, military conflicts that potentially may be carried out using nuclear weapon (given that quite corruptive states possess nuclear weapon).

Unfortunately, in Europe and in the world Ukraine is very corruptive state. In the rating of corruption *Transparency International* in 2017, Ukraine was ranked 130 together with Sierra Leone, Myanmar, Iran and the Gambia. At the same time, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Moldova ranked 122th, Armenia was 107, Belarus and Georgia – 68 and 46 respectively, Latvia and Lithuania – 40 and 38 respectively, Poland – 36, New Zealand – 1. All this demonstrates that modern implementation of the state anticorruption police in Ukraine is ineffective, interfered by solid corruption relations. Moreover, it is obviously ineffective to increase the amount of anti-corruption legislation in Ukraine today (that causes inflation of legislation) and cultivation of anticorruption governing bodies (condition respective institutional inflation). Also, among basic reasons of insufficiency of the state anticorruption policy and the failure of Ukraine (as well as many other post-Soviet states) to prevent and counteract corruption, there are, first of all, the lack of sufficient political will of the heads of state bodies, the inconsistency of the level of anti-corruption culture in society, and ignorance of actual developments of scientists-criminologists within the framework of the theory of corruption and anti-corruption activities by all subjects of anti-corruption activity. The additional problem is insufficient objectivity of theoretical understanding by academic circles and practising lawyers about the nature of corruption and its impact.

It is worth to note that corruption (within the general model of understanding thin phenomenon) means the phenomenon that is objectified through deformation of the established order of requesting-granting-receiving of public goods or attempts to in-violate this order, which are practically conditioned by deviant (in legal and/or social contexts) acts that are carried out by:

(1) a person who has power and influence (as a result of a certain position in public or municipal service or plays a special role in life of society) abuses this power and influence in exchange for items and/or services that satisfy its private interest or the interest of certain groups of people who are under its unlawful intercession;

(2) a person who wants to gain goods for himself/herself or third parties (also, to take someone's goods) offering (and also giving) improper corruption benefit in order to obtain the appropriate goods to a person who has the power and/or possesses the appropriate real influence;

(3) a person who contributes to active or passive actions of corruption practice [6].

So, corruption is the phenomenon that is caused by a certain deviant behaviour of individuals that distorts the practical appearance of the primacy of public interest over the private, distorting the existing balance of these interests.

For today, scientists-criminologists, anticorruption organisations and states, the world community have developed certain minimum standards for the prevention and counteraction of corruption, which enhance the reality of the criminal responsibility for criminal acts of corruption. However, given the experience of Ukraine and many other states, it can be seen that each anticorruption act is usually characterised of a short-term effect, it is gradually depreciating, and eventually "oxidized" and "dies" [7-9]. That is why it is possible to admit that distorting the primacy of public interest over the private is virtually inevitable in human society. Along with this, the corruption perceptions rating *Transparency International* for each year demonstrates as if different information: corruption motive is important in choosing a person's behaviour model, however, this "importance" in different countries varies. Given that, there is the logical question: does the level of corruption perception vary in different countries, or in different countries, people are limited to committing corruption differently (in some – in an effective way, and in others to a lesser extent)? In our opinion, objective result, in this case, depends on the state that quickly responds to human adaptation to anticorruption conditions (in order to commit corruption crimes in these conditions in a more "perfect" and "actual" way) and effectively counteract the possible deviation of society in the appropriate direction [10-11].

Therefore, in theoretical and practical contexts, the question of why precisely the criminal corruption behaviour, despite the numerous risks for participants in corruption relations, is more acceptable than the opposite to it – prosocial? While finding answer to this question, it is necessary to find out the social and legal essence of the accept-

ability of corruption actions for participants of corruption relations, which can be expressed in the corresponding formula.

1. MATERIALS AND METHODS

In accordance with the purpose and objectives of this study, the totality of general science and special methods, as well as means of scientific cognition (in particular, systematic method, systematic and structural analysis, typology and forensic modelling) were used; they allowed analysing comprehensively the problems of corruption theory in the part of the conceptualisation of the logic of acceptability of a corruption behaviour model, which has a direct connection with the cost of unlawful benefits and its acceptability.

It is necessary to select the following points for detailed analysis:

- The notion “corruption” is complicated, multi-layered, systematically organised social phenomenon that combines different components: administrative, political, economic, legal, social, moral and ethical;
- Corruption is the negative social phenomenon that constantly and actively influences on consciousness of citizens, their personal view, forms mercenary amoral values, sets corruption subculture in society, destroys social relations, decreases resources and undermines the credibility of the state;
- Corruption covers higher (elite), middle and low levels of public administration, penetrating all spheres and subsystems of public life, violates rules, affects the interests of all social groups and layers of society, policy, economy, social sphere, culture;
- Corruption can be political, economic, administrative and mundane, can occur in an organised or spontaneous way;
- Corruption has created corruption ethics, which has become an alternative to moral and ethical standards in Ukraine.

Using the method of analysis, it has been established that one of the most significant factors in overcoming corruption is the attitude of the population to this problem. According to the results of research conducted in Ukraine in recent years, more than half of the population is inclined to commit corruption offences if this can contribute to solving the problem. In addition, a significant part of the population, given the lack of relevant knowledge, does not classify certain behaviours as corruption, while recognising the discrepancy of such behaviours with the norms of morality or professional ethics. Provided effective explanatory work the population can change the attitude towards such practice as an unacceptable corruption, and thus, the anti-corruption potential of society will increase significantly.

2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

2.1 Acceptability of corruption for a provider of unlawful corruption benefits

Using corruption, parties of corruptive relations (within the basic model of respective relations, these parties are the one who provides unlawful corruption benefit and the one who receives this benefit in exchange for given promised goods) achieve cer-

tain goods, often inaccessible in non-corruption relations (at all or in the extent necessary for the parties of these relations). In this regard S.V. Lavrenko notes that the special literature distinguishes scientific positions, which argue that corrupt officials, as participants in the relevant relationship, receive from these relations “benefits in the form of material rewards for corrupt “behaviour”. Persons who provide illegal reward to officials also receive access to any resources, exemption from liability for their offences, etc. in exchange for the benefit. In such way, for this category of people, corruption is an absolute blessing” [12], though for society the phenomenon remains nominally negative social and economic and legal phenomenon. IV Pigo-lenko also draws attention to the same fact, emphasising that not all citizens consider corruption to be a negative phenomenon. Most citizens (first of all entrepreneurs) think that “corruption gives an opportunity to do business and bribes can be called equivalent price for speeding up processing of the case or solving other issues. Often both sides of corruption act are ready for mutually beneficial contracts” [13-14]. At the same time, it would be possible to suppose that the conditionally positive effect of corruption is a consequence of corrupting the state: people enter corruption relations as an effective means of optimal participation in society, since the participation of these people in social processes (that is, a complete manifestation of people in society) is impossible without a corruption component due to the corruptions of society itself. However, this conclusion is only partially fair. If for some people corruption relations are a “desperate” means by which a person is trying to obtain the necessary good, and without it (without corruption) cannot obtain the good or receive it in the necessary time, to the extent necessary (for example, recently, the urgent receipt of an international passport in many cities of Ukraine due to high demand for them, caused by the so-called “visa-free travel to Europe”, was actually carried out either in weeks or months from the date of filing the application; earlier it was possible but only when the applicant persistently filled numerous applications to the authorities and made daily phone calls to the migration service that can be estimates as obvious corruption risk), then for other people corruption relations is a reflection of their basic life and survival strategies interact in society.

Cases when a person commits corruption acts to gain a necessary good because optimal achievement of this good is complicated by corruption component (that means a person can achieve a good without corruption, but having wasted another resource, mainly time, physical strength, etc.) may be described as follows (formula 1 that determines *subjective favour of corruption opportuneness for a person who provides unlawful corruption benefits*):

$$RB = \left(\frac{NB - CC - LA - CD}{t} \times 100 \% \right) \times ThCD \quad (1)$$

Wherein

RB – a good achieved using corruption; NB – a necessary good; CC – corruptive complication; LA – lawful actions in order to gain a good (if they were accompanied

by corrupt acts); CD – corruption solution; $ThCD$ – threat to be caught; t – time spent to achieve a goal.

In this, it is needed to pay attention to the fact that a potential participant in corruption relations (mainly one who gives unlawful corruption benefits, a corrupt intermediary), determining the likelihood of a possible corrupt act, will be guided by the criteria of rational efficiency of a corruption solution, determined by economic justification of benefit achieved through corruption – profitability of the good. At the same time, it is wrong to deny that in practical reality there are cases when a person tries to gain a good through corruption, despite the fact that its optimal achievement is devoid of corruption component (in other words, a person can attain a good that he needs without resorting to corrupt practices), but a corrupt decision even more optimises the process of achieving this benefit. Practical demand for this behaviour, in our view, is due to:

- (1) Legal nihilism and guidance by self-centred idea of world outlook (and comprehension within the framework of this idea of social relations);
- (2) Dynamics, competitive character of socio-economic relations, considering which people (by virtue of their psychophysiological nature) strive for increasing dynamics of achievement of necessary good to maximum extent possible.

2.2 Acceptability of corruption for a recipient of unlawful corruption benefit

For the recipient of unlawful corruption benefits (for example, a bribe-taker) this unlawful benefit will be acceptable in each specific case if it meets his/her criminal mercantile expectations (or exceeds those expectations). This leads to the fact that for a recipient of unlawful corruption benefit acceptability (efficiency) of a bribe is subjective category that in a certain way is corrected by numerous conditions, in particular:

- (1) By objective conditions of administrative powers of a person, who has an opportunity to provide goods through corruption, and by boundaries of his/her influence, his/her position in society, the presence of appropriate “competitors” (those who provide similar public services in exchange for a bribe or without such a bribe), etc.;
- (2) By objective economic opportunities of a person, who is empowered to provide goods through corruption, and by a character of his/her subjective evaluation of these opportunities;
- (3) By model a corrupter chose on the basis of its activity;
- (4) By character of a service (good) that is provided in exchange for obtained unlawful corruption benefit.

Exactly these conditions of the acceptability of unlawful corruption benefit are collectively determinative in the formation of the cost of this benefit, and also they are the important circumstance that can be used in anticorruption activity of a state as a lever to support normative behaviour in society.

Impact of self-esteem on the cost of corruption service. Objective conditions of administrative power of a person, who has an opportunity to provide goods through

corruption boundaries of his/her influence, etc. influence on not only the degree of criminal confidence of a person, but also his/her self-esteem, influence of which on a cost of corruption service is difficult to underestimate. Therefore, taking into account mentioned conditions of cost correction and Formula 1, the following hypothesis may be put forward:

Hypothesis 1. *On impact of self-esteem of a potential corruptor on likelihood of his involvement in corruption:* The higher a person (who is able to provide goods through corruption) will assess his/her own importance in society, the higher a cost of a corrupt service that it will be willing to provide.

It follows from the hypothesis that for a person with high assessment of own importance in society the unlawful corruption profit will be equal to a cost of service (or exceed a cost); but in this case some possibilities are not taken into account, for example, objective cost of being caught on committing corruption act, etc.). In this regard, increasing importance of a person in society, who has an opportunity to provide goods through corruption, increases minimum cost of corruption service, which a person may agree to provide, and the contingent of persons capable of providing the corresponding unlawful benefit will be reduced to the same extent. Preventing corruption in the state in such way, it is possible to achieve only the following practical effect:

1. The scope of corruption in the state will be markedly reduced. This can be explained by the fact that under such terms, a number of persons involved in corruptive relations will decrease because of high cost of participation in these relations.

2. Influence of corruption in a state will depend on parallel increase of influence of oligarchic clans on state and processes in society. It is important to take into account that the rate of increase of clan influence will indirectly depends on the following two circumstances:

(1) On the rate of reduction of the number of persons capable of participating in corruption relations, which causes the monopoly on participation in corruption relations;

(2) On real ability of public authorities to counteract the corruptive of the clan influence on the state and on state bodies.

At the same time, it is important also to take into account that most often public authorities are unable to counteract corruptive clan influence because of various reasons. That is why, this and similar models of corruption preventing (for example, increasing the severity of criminal liability, provided that there is selective justice in the state, etc.) often condition an increase in the influence of oligarchic clans in the state, which use the criminal law and administrative legal system in their own interests. Moreover, the following should be emphasised: persons with high assessment of own importance in society, who have an opportunity to provide goods through corruption, will themselves be interested in monopolizing participation in corruption relations, because this, among other things, will “cleanse” the mass of people, who have a potential to provide unlawful corruptive benefits, from “unreliable” elements. In such way, monopolization of participation in corruptive relations provides safety of a corrupter, decreases its anxiety

concerning possible disclosure of respective criminal activity and satisfies his/her self-esteem by interaction with persons who factually possess a state.

However, presented hypothesis 1 allows concluding about the following: assessment of own importance in society of a person, who has an opportunity to provide goods through corruption, is the important factor of corruption preventing if anticorruption strategy of a state includes transparent means of increasing a number of persons who provide the same good. Increasing competition among individuals who have the opportunity to provide similar goods through corruption will result in a lower average cost for the corresponding corrupt service, which will result in dissonance between the requirements of a potential corruptor on the cost of corrupt services and its actual value. So, it can be concluded that success of increasing of competition among persons who have the opportunity to provide similar goods through corruption will be observed when in reality there will be a dissonance of the corresponding requirements and opportunities, provided that the assessment of their own importance in the society of the considered persons will not decrease (or decrease slightly, but not reaching the limits of the acceptability of the actual cost of corrupt service that they are able to provide).

Impact of objective opportunities and their assessment on a cost of corruption service. It is obvious that the lowest limit of a cost of a corruption service by a person, who has an opportunity to provide it, depends on not only person's assessment of own importance in society but also on his/her financial (in general, material) capacity. It is undoubtedly that acceptable cost of unlawful corruptive benefit for the same public service will not be estimated equally by two persons who hold the same post and positions in society, but are unequal in their material capabilities. This can be explained by the fact that amounts, character and value of person possessions determine significantly a person's critical reflection on the value of the objects and services he/she deals with. Value of any service or thing is dependent evaluative category, and a cost of these services and things are objectively expressed result of dependent evaluative judgments of a person that determines the appropriate cost.

In view of the foregoing, it would be possible to assume the following: (1) based on the theory of rational choice, individuals, who are not financially capable, are inclined to corruption behavior; (2) improvement of well-being of individuals, who have the opportunity to provide goods through corruption, will help eradicate corruption or increase the minimum cost of corrupt service, which can potentially lead to a reduction in the extent of corruption in the state (analysis of special scientific developments of scientists [15] demonstrates that this opinion finds support among many legal scholars). However, this conclusion is impossible to consider fully compelling and complete.

Firstly, anticorruption strategy of improving well-being of this category of individuals will condition the same result as increasing of their significance in society – a monopoly on participation in corruptive relations of elite that will lead to increasing of significance and influence of oligarchic clans in the state. Moreover, improving

well-being of individuals, who have an opportunity to provide goods through corruption, by wage increases should not be associated with that these individuals at once develop a sharp rejection of corruption behaviour (but it is expediently to consider that decent wage and presence of necessary social guarantees in a certain way contribute to waning interest in corruptive activity [16]). In particular, in this regard E.S. Moldovan defence the thought that given the low wage and weak social guarantees persons, who perform functions of the state, are not able to adequately secure themselves and their families and therefore often resort to illegal ways to “replenish” their personal budget [16].

Secondly, it is worth remembering that value of something is dependent and evaluative category. Dependence of the category manifests in determination of value judgments by internal and external factors, so by psychological nature of a human, intellectual and moral features of a personality, his/her experience of interaction with society, the society influence on him/her. It follows from this that in the future the anticorruption strategy for improving the well-being of this category of people:

(1) will not have tangible boundaries, as increasing the financial capacity of a person, more often, increases the level of its requirements for quality of life, which ultimately exceeds the possibilities (this fact is one of the answers to the question why highest state officials possessing multimillion, and sometimes multibillion-dollar wealth, are also prone to corruption practices, the same as civil servants of the lower categories);

(2) will be assessed as definitely unfair strategy.

In the context of foregoing and taking into account the essence of corruption in public sector, it is important to pay attention to the fact that each category of state officials corresponds to a certain level of discipline and responsibility that correlates with importance of functions performed by employees of the relevant category and the risks of improper avoidance of these functions. It is worth noting that a risk of non-fulfillment of functions by a person, given the corruption motive, increases with the degree of latitude and significance of powers that are given to a person for the implementation of these functions. In this regard, the following state officials of I-IV categories are very illustrative:

1. Officials while performing their functions become witnesses of “significant money masses” as a budget of a state institution, economic operations of a state body, etc. This experience to a different extent (depending on a measure of psychic health, mental development and a degree of morality of an employee) can: negatively affect the employee’s assessment of a value of certain things, services, and his/her own well-being; cause a sense of dissatisfaction with a quality of own life, a problem of raising the level of which an employee can solve (in particular, in the absence of critical thinking) due to involvement in corruption activities. At the same time, the depreciating effect of “significant money masses” conditions also the level of the lowest cost of a corruption service that a respective employee is ready to provide. Along with this, in

the above-mentioned conditions, a cost of a corrupt service offered to employees will be lower than that which could be considered acceptable to him in full, which can be explained by the atrophy of adequacy of judgments of a respective employee.

2. Officials while performing their functions interact with representatives of upper class of society, part of which makes contact with officials in order to provide unlawful corruptive benefit in exchange for some goods they are empowered to provide. In this, individuals who provide unlawful exchange possessing a massive capital, are able to provide employees with the benefits of participating in corruption relationships that objectively exceed their expectations. In this regard, own financial capacity is depreciated because of certain economic operations in a state body, which are witnessed by an official, is perceived inadequately and is not a proper barrier to engaging in corruption, which allows them to improve their own well-being.

Impact of activity of a corruptor on a corruptive service. In practical activity “systematic corruptors” can require lesser cost for a corruption service than “unsystematic”, so-called “*impulsive corruptors*”, who commit corruptive offences only in response to significant unlawful benefit proposed to them. This can be explained by the fact that an impulse to a corruption act of a person for whom corruption activity for one reason or another is unusual, “goes a long journey” overcoming inner barriers (first of all, ethic barriers and barriers of fear caused by the possibility to be caught) that block this impulse. Speaking allegorically, the following can be noted:

(1) a length of a journey and a height of barriers (and their number), which the corruption impulse has to overcome, forms a cost of a good that a respective individual is ready to provide for unlawful benefit;

(2) each time, corrupt impulse passing through the barriers gradually destroys them, making the process of achieving a goal more confident and fleeting.

The frequency of committing a corruption act by a person, reduces its level anxiety over the deviant act, dissipates fear of a violation of “taboo” (along with an increase in criminal confidence in own impunity and the admissibility of unlawful actions of the corresponding form). Therefore, it is possible to admit that acceptability of corrupt behaviour for a recipient of unlawful benefit will increase each time when an experience of corruption activity enlarges, and a cost of a bribe will decrease along with frequency of committing a corruption act that are corrected by objective indicators:

(1) the level of competitiveness among corruptions of a relevant type;

(2) the level of an average cost of unlawful corruptive benefit provided for analogic goods.

Impact of complexity of the process of providing a corruption service on its cost. In reality, a cost of unlawful benefit also reflects complexity of a service that a corruptor provides. In this meaning, significant factors are not only risks of being caught which are directly related to the activity of providing a respective good through corruption by an authorised person, but also expenses of a recipient of unlawful benefit associated

with provision of s respective good (with the exception of the above “corrupt tax”), – “*production costs*. Accordingly, for a recipient of unlawful corruption benefit a cost will be acceptable if it with the exception of all “production costs”, as well as other mandatory payments (in particular, “corrupt tax”), will satisfy the corruption interest of the person concerned.

CONCLUSIONS

Corrupt behaviour can be sufficiently comprehended in the context of the theory of rational choice, although the peculiarity of this deviant behaviour indicates that it is not fully rational. It is obvious given that in the case of disclosure of facts of commission of corruption offenses and recognition of relevant persons as subjects of corruption crimes, these criminals may be exposed to the corresponding negative effect of criminal liability. However, the dynamics of the spread of corruption and its scope indicate that the corruption model of behaviour, in contrast to the pro-social one, is more acceptable to a wider range of people. That is exactly why determination of the complex of conditions of acceptability of corruption for all participants of corrupt behaviour allows correction to a necessary extent of means to implement the state anticorruption policy by directing them to decrease the level of quality of mentioned conditions. Along with this, it is worth remembering that a certain harmony of conditions of acceptability of corruption is defined by clear patterns, violation of which will not necessarily lead to a decrease in the acceptability of corruption, but may lead to a reformatting of a range of potential participants in corruption relations, as well as forms of corruption in practice. Thus, the strategy of implementation of the anti-corruption policy should be based on the objective forecast of all possible scenarios of a transformation of the conditions of acceptability of corruption after committing destructive influence on them by entities of anticorruption activity.

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